We study two notions of stability in multiwinner elections that are based on the Condorcet criterion. The first notion was introduced by Gehrlein: A committee is stable if each committee member is preferred to each non-member by a (possibly weak) majority of voters. The second notion is called local stability (introduced in this paper): A size-k committee is locally stable in an election with n voters if there is no candidate c and no group of more than n k+1 voters such that each voter in this group prefers c to each committee member. We argue that Gehrlein-stable committees are appropriate for shortlisting tasks, and that locally stable committees are better suited for applications that require proportional representation. The goal of this paper is to analyze these notions in detail, explore their compatibility with notions of proportionality, and investigate the computational complexity of related algorithmic tasks.
Introduction
The notion of a Condorcet winner is among the most important ones in (computational) social choice [1, 6] . Consider a group of agents, each with a preference order over a given set of candidates. The Condorcet condition says that if there exists a candidate c that is preferred to every other candidate by a majority of agents (perhaps a different majority in each case), then this candidate c should be seen as the collectively best option. Such a candidate is known as the Condorcet winner.
In single-winner elections, that is, in settings where the goal is to choose one candidate (presidential elections are a prime example here), there are strong arguments for choosing a Condorcet winner whenever it exists. For example, in case of presidential elections if a Condorcet winner existed but was not chosen as the country's president, a majority of the voters might revolt. (We note, however, that there are also arguments against rules that choose Condorcet winners whenever they exist: for example, such rules suffer from the no-show paradox [19, 7] and fail the reinforcement axiom [20] .)
In this paper, we consider multiwinner elections, that is, settings where instead of choosing a single winner (say, the president) we choose a collective body of a given size (say, a parliament). The goal of our paper is to analyze generalizations of the concept of a Condorcet winner to multiwinner elections. There are several natural definitions of "a Condorcet committee" and we consider their merits and application domains (we write "Condorcet committee" in quotes because several notions could be seen as deserving this term and, thus, eventually we do not use it for any of them).
First, we can take the approach of Gehrlein [15] and Ratliff [21] , where we want the committee to be a collection of high-quality individuals who do not necessarily need to cooperate with each other (this is a natural approach, e.g., when we are shortlisting a group of people for an academic position or for some prize [3, 10] ). In this case, each member of the "Condorcet committee" should be preferred by a majority of voters to all the non-members.
Alternatively, there is the approach of Fishburn [13] (also analyzed from an algorithmic perspective by Darmann [9] ), where we assume that the committee members have to work so closely with each other that it only makes sense to consider voters' preferences over entire committees rather than over individual candidates (this would be natural in selecting, e.g., small working groups). In this case, a "Condorcet committee" is a committee that is preferred to every other committee by a majority of voters. However, this approach is of limited use when voters express their preferences over individual candidates: while such preferences can be lifted to preferences over committees, e.g., by using a scoring function, in the presence of strong synergies among the committee members the induced preferences over committees are unlikely to offer a good approximation of voters' true preferences. Therefore, we do not pursue this approach in our work.
Finally, there is a middle-ground approach, proposed by Elkind et al. [11] , where the committee members focus on representing the voters (this is the case, e.g., in parliamentary elections). In this case, we compare committees against single candidates: We say that a voter i prefers committee W to some candidate c if there exists a candidate w in W (who can be seen as the representative of this voter) such that i prefers w to c. Now we could say that a "Condorcet committee" is one that is preferred to each candidate outside the committee by a majority of voters. Indeed, Elkind et al. [11] refer to such committees as Condorcet winning sets.
Elkind et al. [11] were unable to find an election with no Condorcet winning set of size three; their empirical results suggest that such elections are very unlikely. Thus, to use their approach in order to select large committees in a meaningful way, we should focus on committees that are preferred to unselected candidates by a large fraction of voters. In particular, we argue that when n voters select k candidates, the winning committee should be preferred to each non-member by roughly n − n k voters. The resulting concept, which we call local stability, can be seen as a translation of the notion of justified representation by Aziz et al. [2] from the world of approval-based elections to ranked-ballot elections.
We also consider a stronger variant of this notion, which can be seen as an analogue of extended justified representation from the work of Aziz et al. [2] .
The goal of our work is to contrast the approach based on the ideas of Gehrlein [15] and Ratliff [21] , which we call Gehrlein stability, with the approach based on Condorcet winning sets (i.e., local stability). By considering several restricted domains (single-peaked, single-crossing, and a restriction implied by the existence of political parties), we show that Gehrlein stable committees are very well-suited for shortlisting (as already suggested by Barberá and Coelho [3] ), whereas locally stable committees are better at providing proportional representation. From the point of view of the computational complexity, while in both cases we show NP-hardness of testing the existence of a respective "Condorcet committee", we discover that a variant of the Gehrlein-Ratliff approach leads to a polynomial-time algorithm.
Preliminaries
For every natural number p, we let [p] denote the set {1, 2, . . . , p}.
An election is a pair E = (C, V ), where C = {c 1 , . . . , c m } is a set of candidates and V = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) is a list of voters; we write |V | to denote the number of voters in V . Each voter v ∈ V is endowed with a linear preference order over C, denoted by ≻ v . For ℓ ∈ [m] we write top ℓ (v) to denote ℓ candidates most preferred by v. We write top(v) to denote the single most preferred candidate of voter v, i.e., top 1 (v) = {top(v)}, and for each c ∈ C \ top(v) it holds that top(v) ≻ v c. We write a ≻ v b ≻ v . . . to indicate that v ranks a first and b second, followed by all the other candidates in an arbitrary order. Given two disjoint subsets of candidates S, T ⊆ C, S ∩ T = ∅, we write S ≻ v T to indicate that v prefers each candidate in S to each candidate in T .
A committee is a subset of C. A multiwinner voting rule R takes an election E = (C, V ) and a positive integer k with k ≤ |C| as its input, and outputs a non-empty collection of size-k committees. A multiwinner rule R is said to be resolute if the set R(E, k) is a singleton for each election E = (C, V ) and each committee size k.
Given an election E = (C, V ) with |V | = n and two candidates c, d ∈ C, we say that c wins the pairwise election between c and d if more than n 2 voters in V prefer c to d; if exactly n 2 voters in V prefer c to d, we say that the pairwise election between c and d is tied. The majority graph of an election E = (C, V ) is a directed graph M(E) with vertex set C and the following edge set:
2 | c wins the pairwise election between c and d .
Observe that if the number of voters n is odd, then M(E) is a tournament, i.e., for each pair of candidates c, d ∈ C exactly one of their connecting edges, (c, d) or (d, c), is present in M(E). We will also consider the weak majority graph of E, which we denote by W (E): this is the directed graph obtained from M(E) by adding edges (c, d) and (d, c) for each pair of candidates c, d such that the pairwise election between c and d is tied. A candidate c is said to be a Condorcet winner of an election E = (C, V ) if the outdegree of c in M(E)
is |C| − 1; c is said to be a weak Condorcet winner of E if the outdegree of c in W (E) is |C| − 1.
Gehrlein Stability and Local Stability
Gehrlein [15] proposed a simple, natural extension of the notion of a weak Condorcet winner to the case of multiwinner elections, and a similar definition was subsequently introduced by Ratliff [21] . We recall and discuss Gehrlein's definition, and then put forward a different approach to defining good committees, which is inspired by the recent work on Condorcet winning sets [11] and on justified representation in approval-based committee elections [2] .
Gehrlein Stability
Gehrlein [15] and Ratliff [21] base their approach on the following idea: a committee is unstable if there exists a majority of voters who prefer a candidate that is not currently in the committee to some current committee member.
Definition 1 (Gehrlein [15] ; Ratliff [21] ). Consider an election E = (C, V ). A committee S ⊆ C is weakly Gehrlein-stable if for each committee member c ∈ S and each nonmember d ∈ C \ S it holds that c wins or ties the pairwise election between c and d. Committee S is strongly Gehrlein-stable if for each c ∈ S and each d ∈ S the pairwise election between c and d is won by c.
By definition, each strongly Gehrlein-stable committee is also weakly Gehrlein-stable, and the two notions are equivalent if the majority graph M(E) is a tournament. Further, a strongly (respectively, weakly) Gehrlein-stable committee of size one is simply a Condorcet winner (respectively, a weak Condorcet winner) of a given election. More generally, each member of a strongly (respectively, weakly) Gehrlein-stable committee would be a Condorcet winner (respectively, a weak Condorcet winner) should the other committee members be removed from the election. Note also that given a committee S, it is straightforward to verify if it is strongly (respectively, weakly) Gehrlein-stable: it suffices to check that there is no candidate in C \ S that ties or defeats (respectively, defeats) some member of S in their pairwise election.
Gehrlein stability has received some attention in the literature. In particular, Ratliff [21] , Coelho [8] , and, very recently, Kamwa [17] , proposed and analyzed a number of multiwinner rules that satisfy weak Gehrlein stability, i.e., elect weakly Gehrlein stable committees whenever they exist. These rules can be seen as analogues of classic single-winner Condorcet-consistent rules, such as Maximin or Copeland's rule (see, e.g., the survey by Zwicker [26] for their definitions). Specifically, each of these rules is based on a function that assigns non-negative scores to committees in such a way that committees with score 0 are exactly the weakly Gehrlein-stable committees; it then outputs the committees with the minimum score.
Gehrlein Stability and Majority Graphs Gehrlein stability is closely related to a classic tournament solution concept, namely, the top cycle (see, e.g., the survey by Brandt, Brill and Harrenstein [5] for an overview of tournament solution concepts). Indeed, if the majority graph M(E) is a tournament, then every top cycle in M(E) is a Gehrlein-stable committee (recall that for tournaments weak Gehrlein stability is equivalent to strong Gehrlein stability, so we use the term 'Gehrlein stability' to refer to both notions). In the presence of ties, the relevant solution concepts are the Smith set and the Schwarz set: the former corresponds to a weakly Gehrlein-stable committee and the latter corresponds to a strongly Gehrlein-stable committee.
However, there is an important difference between Gehrlein committees and each of these tournament solution concepts: When computing a tournament solution, we aim to minimize the number of elements in the winning set, whereas in the context of multiwinner elections our goal is to find a weakly/strongly Gehrlein-stable committee of a given size. This difference has interesting algorithmic implications. While it is easy to find a Smith set for a given tournament, in Section 5 we show that it is NP-hard to determine if a given election admits a weakly Gehrlein-stable committee of a given size. On the other hand, we can extend the existing algorithm for finding a Schwarz set to identify a strongly Gehrlein-stable committee. We defer most of our computational results until Section 5, but we present the proof of this result here because it implicitly provides a very useful characterization of strongly Gehrlein-stable committees. Theorem 1. Given an election E = (C, V ) and a positive integer k with k ≤ |C|, we can decide in polynomial time whether E admits a strongly Gehrlein-stable committee of size k. Moreover, if such a committee exists, then it is unique.
Proof. Given an election E = (C, V ), we let C = {C 1 , . . . , C r } be the list of strongly connected components of W (E); note that a graph can be decomposed into strongly connected components in polynomial time. Given two candidates a, b ∈ C, we write a → b if W (E) contains a directed path from a to b.
Consider two distinct sets C i , C j ∈ C and two candidates a ∈ C i , b ∈ C j . Note that the pairwise election between a and b cannot be tied, since otherwise a and b would be in the same set. Suppose without loss of generality that a beats b in their pairwise election. Then for each a
On the other hand, we cannot have b ′ → a ′ , as this would mean that a ′ and b ′ belong to the same connected component of W (E). Thus, we can define a total order on C as follows: for C i , C j ∈ C we set C i < C j if i = j and a → b for each a ∈ C i , b ∈ C j . By the argument above, < is indeed a total order on C; we can renumber the elements of C so that C 1 < · · · < C r . Then for a ∈ C i , b ∈ C j we have a → b if and only if i ≤ j. Now, consider a strongly Gehrlein-stable committee S. Suppose that a → b and b ∈ S. It is easy to see that a ∈ S; this follows by induction on the length of the shortest path from a to b in W (E). Hence, every strongly Gehrlein-stable committee is of the form i≤s C i for some s ∈ [r]. Thus, there is a strong Gehrlein committee of size k if and only if
. This argument also shows that a strongly Gehrlein-stable committee of a given size is unique.
We have argued that for tournaments the notions of weak Gehrlein stability and strong Gehrlein stability coincide. We obtain the following corollary. Corollary 1. Consider an election E = (C, V ). If W (E) is a tournament, we can decide in polynomial time whether E has a weakly Gehrlein-stable committee of a given size. Moreover, if such a committee exists, it is unique.
Gehrlein Stability and Enlargement Consistency Interestingly, Barberá and Coelho [3] have shown that weak Gehrlein stability is incompatible with enlargement consistency: For every resolute multiwinner rule R that elects a weakly Gehrlein-stable committee whenever such a committee exists, there exists an election E and committee size k such that the only committee in R(E, k) is not a subset of the only committee in R(E, k + 1).
1 While this result means that such rules are not well-suited for shortlisting tasks [3, 10] , it only holds for weak Gehrlein stability and not for strong Gehrlein stability.
Indeed, let us consider the following multiwinner variant of the Copeland rule (it is very similar to the NED rule of Coelho [8] and we will call it strong-NED). Given an election E, the score of a candidate is its outdegree in M(E). Strong-NED chooses the committee of k candidates with the highest scores (to match the framework of Barberá and Coelho [3] , the rule should be resolute and so we break ties lexicographically). By its very definition, strong-NED satisfies enlargement consistency. Further, if there is a committee W that is strongly Gehrlein-stable, then strong-NED chooses this committee (if there are m candidates in total, then the outdegree of each candidate from W is at least m − |W |, whereas the outdegree of each candidate outside of W is at most m − |W | − 1; Barberá and Coelho [3] also gave this argument, but assuming an odd number of voters).
Local Stability
An important feature of Gehrlein stability is that it is strongly driven by the majority opinions. Suppose, for instance, that a group of 1000 voters is to elect 10 representatives from the set {c 1 , . . . , c 20 }, and the society is strongly polarized: 501 voters rank the candidates as c 1 ≻ · · · ≻ c 20 , whereas the remaining 499 voters rank the candidates as c 20 ≻ · · · ≻ c 1 . Then the unique Gehrlein-stable committee of size 10 consists of candidates c 1 , . . . , c 10 , and the preferences of 499 voters are effectively ignored. While this is appropriate in some settings, in other cases we may want to ensure that candidates who are well-liked by significant minorities of voters are also elected.
Aziz et al. [2] formalize this idea in the context of approval voting, where each voter submits a set of candidates that she approves of (rather than a ranked ballot). Specifically, they say that committee S, |S| = k, provides justified representation in an election (C, V ) with |V | = n, where each voter i is associated with an approval ballot
′ , yet there exists a candidate c ∈ C \ S approved by all voters in V ′ . Informally speaking, this definition requires that each 'cohesive' group of voters of size at least q = ⌈ n k ⌉ is represented in the committee. The choice of threshold q = ⌈ n k ⌉ (known as the Hare quota) is natural in the context of approval voting: it ensures that, when the electorate is composed of k equal-sized groups of voters, with sets of candidates approved by each group being pairwise disjoint, each group is allocated a representative.
Extending this idea to ordinal ballots and to an arbitrary threshold q, we obtain the following definition.
Definition 2. Consider an election E = (C, V ) with |V | = n and a positive value q ∈ Q. A committee S violates local stability for quota q if there exists a group V * ⊆ V with |V * | ≥ q and a candidate c ∈ C \ S such that each voter from V * prefers c to each member of S; otherwise, S provides local stability for quota q.
Note that, while in the context of approval voting the notion of group cohesiveness can be defined in absolute terms (a group is considered cohesive if there is a candidate approved by all group members), for ranked ballots a cohesive group is defined relative to a given committee (a group is cohesive with respect to S if all its members prefer some candidate to S). Another important difference between the two settings is that, while a committee that provides justified representation is guaranteed to exist and can be found in polynomial time [2] , a committee that provides local stability may fail to exist, even if we use the same value of the quota, i.e., q = ⌈ n k ⌉. Set k = 2d + 1; then for d ≥ 2 we obtain ⌈ n k ⌉ = 4. We will now argue that this election admits no locally stable committee of size k for quota q = ⌈ n k ⌉. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that S is a locally stable committee of size k for this value of the quota. Note first that for each i ∈ [d] we have |{x i , y i , z i } ∩ S| ≥ 2. Indeed, suppose that this is not the case for some i ∈ [d]. By symmetry, we can assume without loss of generality that y i , z i ∈ S. However, then there are 4 voters who prefer z i to every member of the committee, a contradiction with local stability. Thus, S contains at least 2d candidates in X ∪ Y ∪ Z and hence |S ∩ {a, b}| ≤ 1. Thus at least one of a or b does not belong to the committee and either the four a ≻ b ≻ · · · voters or the four b ≻ a ≻ · · · voter witness that S is not locally stable. or the second four voters
In Section 5, we will use the idea from Example 1 to argue that it is NP-hard to decide whether a given election admits a locally stable committee.
Definition 2 does not specify a value of the quota q. Intuitively, the considerations that should determine the choice of quota are the same as for Single Transferable Vote (STV), and one can choose any of the quotas that are used for STV (see, e.g., the survey by Tideman [25] ). In particular, for k = 1 and the Hare quota q = ⌈ n k ⌉ we obtain Pareto optimality: a committee {a} of size k = 1 is locally stable for quota ⌈ n k ⌉ if there is no other candidate c such that all voters prefer c to a. For k = 1 and q = ⌈ n k+1 ⌉ (the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota), locally stable committees for quota q are those whose unique element is a weak Condorcet winner; for k = 1 and q = ⌊ n k+1 ⌋ + 1 (the Droop quota), a locally stable committee for quota q has the Condorcet winner as its only member. Remark 1. For k = 2 and q = n k , locally stable committees are closely related to Condorcet winning sets, as defined by Elkind et al. [11] , and, more generally, locally stable committees are related to θ-winning sets [11] . Elkind et al. [11] say that a set of candidates S is a θ-winning set in an election (C, V ) with |V | = n if for each candidate c ∈ C \ S there are more than θn voters who prefer some member of S to c; a 1 2 -winning set is called a Condorcet winning set. Importantly, unlike locally stable committees, θ-winning sets are defined in terms of strict inequalities. If we replace 'more than θn' with 'at least θn' in the definition of Elkind et al. [11] , we obtain the definition of local stability for quota q = (1 − θ)n. Elkind et al. [11] define a voting rule that for a given election E and committee size k outputs a size-k θ-winning set for the smallest possible θ. This rule, by definition, outputs locally stable committees whenever they exist. We remark that the 15-voter, 15-candidate election described by Elkind et al. [11] is an example of an election with no locally stable committee for q = n k and k = 2, thus complementing Example 1 (which works for odd k ≥ 5).
For concreteness, from now on we fix the quota to be q = ⌊ n k+1 ⌋ + 1 (the Droop quota), and use the expression 'locally stable committee' to refer to locally stable committees for this value of the quota. However, some of our results extend to other values of q as well. Full Local Stability Aziz et al. [2] also proposed the notion of extended justified representation, which deals with larger groups of voters that, intuitively, are entitled to more than a single representative. To apply their idea to ranked ballots, we need to explain how voters evaluate possible deviations. We require a new committee to be a Pareto improvement over the old one: given a committee S and a size-ℓ set of candidates T , we say that a voter v prefers T to S if there is a bijection µ : T → top ℓ (S) such that for each c ∈ T voter v weakly prefers c to µ(c) and for some c ∈ T voter v strictly prefers c to µ(c). We now present our analogue of extended justified representation for ranked ballots, which we call full local stability. Definition 3. Consider an election (C, V ) with |V | = n. We say that a committee S,
+ 1 and a set of ℓ candidates T , such that each voter v ∈ V * prefers T to S; otherwise, S provides ℓ-local stability. A committee S with |S| = k provides full local stability if it provides ℓ-local stability for all ℓ ∈ [k].
By construction, 1-local stability is simply local stability, and hence every committee that provides full local stability also provides local stability. Local stability and full local stability extend from committees to voting rules in a natural way.
Definition 4.
A multiwinner voting rule R satisfies (full) local stability if for every election E = (C, V ) and every target committee size k such that in E the set of size-k committees that provide (full) local stability is not empty, it holds that every committee in R(E) provides (full) local stability.
Weakly/strongly Gehrlein-stable rules can be defined in a similar manner.
Solid Coalitions and Dummett's Proportionality Let us examine the relation between (full) local stability, and the solid coalitions property and Dummett's proportionality. Both these notions were used by Elkind et al. [10] as indicators of voting rules' ability to find committees that represent voters proportionally (however, we give a slightly different definition than they give; see explanation below).
Definition 5. Consider an election (C,
Proof. We present the proof for local stability; for full local stability the same argument can be used. Consider an election E, a target committee size k, and a committee S such that some ⌈ n k ⌉ voters rank a candidate c ∈ C \S first. Since
⌋+1, and so the same group of voters witnesses that S violates local stability.
The solid coalitions property and Dummett's proportionality are usually defined as properties of multiwinner rules. In contrast, Definition 5 treats them as properties of coalitions, which is essential for establishing a relation such as the one given in Proposition 2. Indeed, local stability as the property of a rule puts no restrictions on the output of the rule for profiles for which there exists no locally stable committees and, in particular, for such profiles local stability does not guarantee the solid coalitions property.
Three Restricted Domains
In Section 3 we have argued that Gehrlein stability is a majoritarian notion, whereas local stability is directed towards proportional representation. Now we reinforce this intuition by describing the structure of Gehrlein-stable and locally stable committees for three well-studied restricted preference domains. Namely, we consider single-crossing elections, single-peaked elections, and elections where the voters have preferences over parties (modeled as large sets of 'similar' candidates).
The following observation will be useful in our analysis. Consider an election E = (C, V ) for which M(E) is a transitive tournament, i.e., if (a, b) and (b, c) are edges of M(E) then (a, c) is also an edge of M(E). In such a case, the set of ordered pairs (a, b) such that (a, b) ∈ M(E) is a linear order on C and we refer to it as the majority preference order. Given a positive integer k, we let the centrist committee S center consist of the top k candidates in the majority preference order. Theorem 1 implies the following simple observation.
Proposition 3. If M(E) is transitive then for each committee size k, S center is strongly Gehrlein-stable.
It is well known that if the number of voters is odd and the election is either singlepeaked or single-crossing (see definitions below), then M(E) is a transitive tournament. Thus Proposition 3 is very useful in such settings.
Single-Crossing Preferences
The notion of single-crossing preferences was proposed by Mirrlees [18] and Roberts [22] . Informally speaking, an election is single-crossing if (the voters can be ordered in such a way that) as we move from the first voter to the last one, the relative order within each pair of candidates changes at most once. For a review of examples where single-crossing preferences can arise, we refer the reader to the work of Saporiti and Tohmé [24] .
Single-crossing elections have many desirable properties. In the context of our work, the most important one is that if E = (C, V ) is a single-crossing election with an odd number of voters, then M(E) is a transitive tournament. Moreover if |V | = 2n ′ + 1, the majority preference order coincides with the preferences of the (n ′ + 1)-st voter [23] . By Proposition 3, this means that for single-crossing elections with an odd number of voters the centrist committee exists, is strongly Gehrlein-stable, and consists of the top k candidates in the preference ranking of the median voter, which justifies the term centrist committee.
Proposition 4. For a single-crossing election with an odd number of voters, the centrist committee is strongly Gehrlein-stable.
Locally stable committees turn out to be very different. Let E = (C, V ) be a singlecrossing election with |V | = n, and let k be the target committee size; then the Droop quota for E is q = n k+1 + 1. We say that a size-k committee S is single-crossing uniform for E if for each ℓ ∈ [k] it contains the candidate ranked first by voter v ℓ·q . Note that a single-crossing uniform committee need not be unique: e.g., if all the voters rank the same candidate first, then every committee containing this candidate is single-crossing uniform.
Example 2. Figure 1 shows a single-crossing election with 15 voters over the candidate set C = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k}. The first voter ranks the candidates in the alphabetic order, and the last voter ranks them in the reverse alphabetic order. For readability, we list the top four-ranked candidates only. For the target committee size 4, the centrist committee (marked with a rectangle) is {c, d, e, f }, and the unique single-crossing uniform committee is {b, d, g, i} (marked with dashed ellipses). If we reorder the voters from v 15 to v 1 , the unique single-crossing uniform committee is {c, d, h, j}.
We will now argue that single-crossing uniform committees are locally stable.
Proposition 5. For every single-crossing election E = (C, V ) and for every k ∈ [|C|] it holds that every size-k single-crossing uniform committee for E is locally stable.
Proof. Fix a single-crossing election E = (C, V ) with |V | = n and a target committee size k; set q = n k+1 + 1. Consider a committee S, |S| = k, that is single-crossing uniform with respect to E. We will show that S is locally stable.
Consider an arbitrary candidate c ∈ S. Suppose first that some voter v i with i < q ranks c above all candidates in S. Let a = top(v q ). As a ∈ S and E is single-crossing, each voter v j with j ≥ q prefers a to c. Thus, there are at most q − 1 voters who prefer c to each member of S. Now, suppose that some voter v i with ℓq < i < (ℓ + 1)q for some ℓ ∈ [k − 1] ranks c above all candidates in S; let a = top(v ℓ·q ), b = top(v (ℓ+1)·q ). By construction we have a, b ∈ S and by the single-crossing property a = b (if a = b, then a and c would cross more than once). Also, by the single-crossing property all voters v j with j ≤ ℓq rank a above c and all voters v j ′ with j ′ ≥ (ℓ + 1)q rank b above c. Thus, there are at most q − 1 voters who prefer c to each member of S.
Finally, suppose that some voter v i with i > kq ranks c above all members of S; let a = top(v k·q ). We have a ∈ S and by the single-crossing property all voters v j with j ≤ kq rank a above c. Thus, there are at most n − kq voters who may prefer c to a, and q > n k+1 implies n − qk < n − nk k+1 = n k+1 < q. In each case, the number of voters who may prefer c to all members of S is strictly less than q.
The following example shows that a single-crossing uniform committee can violate Gehrlein stability and, similarly, that the centrist committee can violate local stability. + 1 = 3. The committee {a, c} is single-crossing uniform for this election, yet four voters out of seven prefer b to a. The committee {b, c} is centrist, yet it is not locally stable since there are q = 3 voters who prefer a to both b and c.
Single-Peaked Preferences
The class of single-peaked preferences, first introduced by Black [4] , is perhaps the most extensively studied restricted preference domain. Definition 7. Let ✁ be an order over C. We say that an election E = (C, V ) is singlepeaked with respect to ✁ if for each voter v ∈ V and for each pair of candidates a, b ∈ C such that top(v) ✁ a ✁ b or b ✁ a ✁ top(v) it holds that a ≻ v b. We will refer to ✁ as a societal axis for E.
Just as in single-crossing elections, in single-peaked elections with an odd number of voters the majority preference order is transitive and hence the centrist committee is well-defined and strongly Gehrlein-stable.
Proposition 6. For a single-peaked election with an odd number of voters, the centrist committee is strongly Gehrlein-stable.
Moreover, we can define an analogue of a single-crossing uniform committee for singlepeaked elections. To this end, given an election E = (C, V ) that is single-peaked with respect to the societal axis ✁, we reorder the voters so that for the new order
we say that an order of voters V ′ that has this property is ✁-compatible. We can now use the same construction as in Section 4.1. Specifically, given an election E = (C, V ) with |V | = n that is single-peaked with respect to ✁ and a target committee size k, we set q = n k+1 + 1, and say that a committee S is single-peaked uniform for E if for some ✁-compatible order of voters V Proposition 7. For every single-peaked election E = (C, V ) and for every k ∈ [|C|] it holds that every size-k single-peaked uniform committee for E is locally stable.
Proof. Fix an election E = (C, V ) with |C| = m, |V | = n that is single-peaked with respect to ✁ and a target committee size k. Assume without loss of generality that ✁ orders the candidates as c 1 ✁ · · · ✁ c m and that V is ✁-compatible. Consider a singlepeaked uniform committee S of size k. Recall that q = n k+1
Suppose first that j < ℓ. Then for each voter v i with i ≥ q the candidate top(v i ) is either c ℓ or some candidate to the right of c ℓ . Thus, all such voters prefer c ℓ to c j , and hence there can be at most q − 1 voters who prefer c j to each member of S. By a similar argument, if j > r, there are at most n − kq < q voters who prefer c j to each member of S.
It remains to consider the case ℓ < j < r. Let ℓ ′ = max{t | t < j, c t ∈ S}, r ′ = min{t | t > j, c t ∈ S}. Set i = max{i : top(v i·q ) = c ℓ ′ }; then the most preferred candidate of voter v (i+1)·q is c r ′ . Since the voters' preferences are single-peaked with respect to ✁, v i·q and all voters that precede her in V prefer c ℓ ′ to c j , and v (i+1)·q and all voters that appear after her in V prefer c r ′ to c j . Thus, only the voters in the set V ′ = {v i·q+1 , . . . , v i·q+q−1 } may prefer c j to all voters in S, and |V ′ | ≤ q − 1.
Thus, for any choice of c j ∈ S fewer than q voters prefer c j to all members of S, and hence S is locally stable.
The proof of Proposition 7 is very similar to the proof of Proposition 5; we omit it due to space constraints.
Observe that the election from Example 3 is single-peaked and committee {a, c} is single-peaked uniform for that election. This shows that for single-peaked elections a single-peaked uniform committee can violate Gehrlein stability and the centrist committee can violate local stability.
Party-List Elections
When candidates are affiliated with political parties, it is not unusual for the voters' preferences to be driven by party affiliations: a voter who associates herself with a political party, ranks the candidates who belong to that party above all other candidates (but may rank candidates that belong to other parties arbitrarily). In the presence of a strong party discipline, we may additionally assume that all supporters of a given party rank candidates from that party in the same way. We will call elections with this property party-list elections.
Definition 8.
An election E = (C, V ) is said to be a party-list election for a target committee size k if we can partition the set of candidates C into pairwise disjoint sets C 1 , . . . , C p and the set of voters V into pairwise disjoint groups V 1 , . . . , V p so that (i) |C i | ≥ k for each i ∈ [p], (ii) each voter from V i prefers each candidate in C i to each candidate in C \ C i , (iii) for each i ∈ [p] all voters in V i order the candidates in C i in the same way.
Party-list elections are helpful for understanding the difference between local stability and full local stability. Indeed, when all voters have the same preferences over candidates, local stability only ensures that a committee contains the unanimously most preferred candidate. In particular, the committee that consists of the single most preferred candidate and the k − 1 least preferred candidates is locally stable. On the other hand, full local stability imposes additional constraints. For example, when preferences are unanimous, only the committee that consists of the k most preferred candidates satisfies full local stability. Generalizing this observation, we will now show that in party-list elections a fully locally stable committee selects representatives from each set C i in proportion to the number of voters in V i . Theorem 2. Let E = (C, V ) be a party-list election for a target committee size k, and let (C 1 , . . . , C p ) and (V 1 , . . . , V p ) be the respective partitions of C and V . Then for each i ∈ [p] every committee S of size k that provides full local stability for E contains all candidates ranked in top k · 
this would mean that S violates ℓ-local stability for E, a contradiction. 
Clearly, E is a party-list election. To provide full local stability, a committee has to contain the top two candidates from X, the top candidate from Y and the top candidate from Z. Thus, {x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , z 1 } is the unique fully locally stable committee.
On the other hand, observe that in an election where two parties have equal support, i.e., when C and V are partitioned into C 1 , C 2 and V 1 , V 2 , respectively, and |V 1 | = |V 2 |, every committee S that contains the top candidate in C 1 (according to voters in V 1 ) and the top candidate in C 2 (according to voters in V 2 ), provides local stability. Thus, local stability can capture the idea of diversity to some extent, but not of fully proportional representation.
Finally, note that Gehrlein stability does not offer any guarantees in the party-list framework: If a party is supported by more than half of the voters, then the top k candidates of this party form the unique strongly Gehrlein-stable committee; if a party is supported by fewer than half of the voters then it is possible that none of its candidates is in a weakly Gehrlein-stable committee.
Computational Complexity
We will now argue that finding stable committees can be computationally challenging, both for weak Gehrlein stability and for local stability (recall that, in contrast, for strong Gehrlein stability Theorem 1 provides a polynomial-time algorithm). Full local stability appears to be even more demanding: we provide evidence that even checking whether a given committee is fully locally stable is hard as well.
Theorem 3. Given an election E = (C, V ) and a target committee size k with k ≤ |C|, it is NP-complete to decide if there exists a weakly Gehrlein-stable committee of size k for E.
Proof. It is immediate that this problem is in NP: given an election E = (C, V ), a target committee size k, and a committee S with |S| = k, we can check that S has no incoming edges in M(E).
To show hardness, we provide a reduction from Partially Ordered Knapsack. An instance of this problem is given by a list of r ordered pairs of positive integers L = ((s 1 , w 1 ) , . . . , (s r , w r )), a capacity bound b, a target weight t, and a directed acyclic graph Γ = ([r], A). It is a 'yes'-instance if there is a subset of indices I ⊆ [r] such that i∈I s i ≤ b, i∈I w i ≥ t and for each directed edge (i, j) ∈ A it holds that j ∈ I implies i ∈ I. This problem is strongly NP-complete; indeed, it remains NP-hard if s i = w i and w i ≤ r for all i ∈ [r] [16] . Note that if s i = w i for all i ∈ [r], we can assume that b = t, since otherwise we obviously have a 'no'-instance.
Given an instance L, b, t, Γ of Partially Ordered Knapsack with L = ((s 1 , w 1 ), . . . , (s r , w r ) 
i } and set C = i∈[r] C i . We construct the set of voters V and the voters' preferences so that the majority graph of the resulting election (C, V ) has the following structure:
(1) for each i ∈ [r] the induced subgraph on C i is a strongly connected tournament; (2) for each (i, j) ∈ A there is an edge from each candidate in C i to each candidate in C j ; (3) there are no other edges.
Using McGarvey's theorem, we can ensure that the number of voters |V | is polynomial in |C|; as we have w i ≤ r for all i ∈ [r], it follows that both the number of voters and the number of candidates are polynomial in r. Finally, we let the target committee size k be equal to the knapsack size t. Let I be a witness that L, b, t, Γ is a 'yes'-instance of Partially Ordered Knapsack. Then the set of candidates S = i∈I C i is a weakly Gehrlein-stable committee of size k: by construction, |S| = i∈I |C i | = i∈I w i = t, and the partial order constraints ensure that S has no incoming edges in the weighted majority graph of (C, V ).
Conversely, suppose that S is a weakly Gehrlein-stable committee of size k for (C, V ). Note first that for each i ∈ [r] it holds that C i ∩ S = ∅ implies C i ⊆ S. Indeed, if we have c ∈ C i ∩ S, c ′ ∈ C i \ S for some i ∈ [r] and some c, c ′ ∈ C i then in the weighted majority graph of (C, V ) there is a path from c ′ to c. This path contains an edge that crosses from C i \ S into C i ∩ S, a contradiction with S being a weakly Gehrlein-stable committee. Thus, S = i∈I C i for some I ⊆ [r], and we have i∈I w i = i∈I |C i | = k = t. Moreover, for each directed edge (i, j) ∈ A such that C j ⊆ S we have C i ⊆ S: indeed, the weighted majority graph of (C, V ) contains edges from candidates in C i to candidates in C j , so if C i ⊆ S, at least one of these edges would enter S, a contradiction with S being a weakly Gehrlein-stable committee. It follows that I is a witness that we have started with a 'yes'-instance of Partially Ordered Knapsack.
We obtain a similar result for locally stable committees.
Theorem 4. Given an election E = (C, V ) and a target committee size k, with k ≤ |C|, it is NP-complete to decide if there exists a locally stable committee of size k for E.
Proof. It is easy to see that this problem is in NP: given an election (C, V ) together with a target committee size k and a committee S with |S| = k, we can check for each c ∈ C \S whether there exist at least n k + 1 voters who prefer c to each member of S.
To prove NP-hardness, we reduce from 3-Regular Vertex Cover. Recall that an instance of 3-Regular Vertex Cover is given by a 3-regular graph G = (V, E) and a positive integer t; it is a 'yes'-instance if G admits a vertex cover of size at most t, i.e., a subset of vertices
This problem is known to be NP-complete [14] .
Consider an instance (G, t) of 3-Regular Vertex Cover with G = (V, E), V = {ν 1 , . . . , ν r }. Note that we have |E| = 1.5r, and we can assume that t < r − 1, since otherwise (G, t) is trivially a 'yes'-instance. Given (G, t), we construct an election as follows. We set C = V ∪ X ∪ Y ∪ Z, where X = {x 1 , . . . , x 1.5r }, Y = {y 1 , . . . , y 1.5r }, Z = {z 1 , . . . , z 1.5r }. For each edge {ν, ν ′ } ∈ E we construct one voter with preferences ν ≻ ν ′ ≻ · · · and one voter with preferences ν ′ ≻ ν ≻ · · · ; we refer to these voters as the edge voters. Also, for each j ∈ [1.5r] we construct two voters with preferences x j ≻ y j ≻ z j ≻ · · · , two voters with preferences y j ≻ z j ≻ x j ≻ · · · , and two voters with preferences z j ≻ x j ≻ y j ≻ · · · ; we refer to these voters as the xyz-voters. We set k = t + 3r. Note that the number of voters in our instance is n = 2|E| + 6 · 1.5r = 12r. Thus, using the fact that 0 < t < r − 1, we can bound n k+1
as follows:
Thus the Droop quota is q = n k+1 + 1 = 4. Now, suppose that V ′ is a vertex cover of size at most t; we can assume that |V ′ | is exactly t, as otherwise we can add arbitrary t − |V ′ | vertices to V ′ , and it remains a vertex cover. Then S = V ′ ∪ X ∪ Y is a locally stable committee of size |S| = t + 2 · 1.5r = t + 3r. Indeed, for each voter one of her top two candidates is in the committee (for edge voters this follows from the fact that V ′ is a vertex cover and for xyz-voters this is immediate from the construction), so local stability can only be violated if for some candidate c ∈ S there are at least q = 4 voters who rank c first. However, by construction each candidate is ranked first by at most three voters.
Conversely, suppose that S is a locally stable committee of size t + 3r. The argument in Example 1 shows that |S ∩ {x j , y j , z j }| ≥ 2 for each j = 1, . . . , 1.5r. Hence, |S ∩ V | ≤ t. Now, suppose that S ∩ V is not a vertex cover for G. Consider an edge {ν, ν ′ } with ν, ν ′ ∈ S. Since G is 3-regular, there are three edge voters who rank ν first; clearly, these voters prefer ν to each member of S. Moreover, there is an edge voter whose preference order is ν ′ ≻ ν ≻ . . . ; this voter, too, prefers ν to each member of S. Thus, we have identified four voters who prefer ν to S, a contradiction with the local stability of S. This shows that S ∩ V is a vertex cover for G, and we have already argued that |S ∩ V | ≤ t.
As we have observed in the proof of Theorem 4, it is possible to verify in polynomial time that a given committee is locally stable. This is not the case for full local stability, as we the following theorem shows.
Theorem 5. Given an election E = (C, V ) and a committee S, it is coNP-complete to decide whether S provides full local stability for E.
Proof. To see that this problem is in coNP, note that a certificate for a 'no'-instance is an integer ℓ ∈ [k], a set V * of voters with |V * | = ℓn |S|+1 + 1 and a set T of candidates with |T | = ℓ such that voters in V * prefer T to S. For hardness, we reduce from the NP-complete Multicolored Clique problem [12] to the complement of our problem. An instance of Multicolored Clique is given by an undirected graph G = (U, E), a positive integer s, and a mapping (coloring) g : U → [s]; it is a 'yes'-instance if there exists a set of vertices {u 1 , . . . , u s } ⊆ U with g(u i ) = i for every i ∈ [s] such that {u 1 , . . . , u s } forms a clique in G. We write U a to denote the neighborhood of a vertex a ∈ U, i.e., N a = {b ∈ U | {a, b} ∈ E} and we write U i to denote all i-colored vertices, i.e., U i = {u ∈ U : g(u) = i}.
We have to make a few additional assumptions, all of which do not impact the hardness of Multicolored Clique: First, we assume that s > 2, clearly hardness remains to hold. Further, we assume without loss of generality that s 2 divides |U| and that that |U i | = |U | /s; this can be achieved by adding disconnected vertices. Finally, we assume that candidates of the same color are not connected.
We construct an election as follows: Let S = {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w s+2 } and C = U ∪ S. We refer to candidates in U as vertex candidates and we say that u is an i-colored candidate if g(u) = i. We create a voter v a for each vertex a ∈ U; this voter's preferences are
where sets are ordered arbitrarily. Let V U = {v a | a ∈ U}. Furthermore, for every i, j ∈ [s] we create a set of voters V ; we will use this condition in the following proof. Let us now prove that S does not provide full local stability for (C, V ) if and only if (U, E) has a clique of size s.
Let U ′ be a multicolored clique of size s in G, i.e., for all i ∈ [s] it holds that C i ∩U ′ = ∅. We will show that S violates (s + 1)-local stability. Let us consider T = {w s+1 } ∪ U ′ ; we claim that a sufficient number of voters prefers T to S. Note that s voters corresponding to U ′ prefer T to S. Furthermore, all voters inV prefer T to S. In total these are s+s 2 ·(s+1)· |U | s 2 = (s+1)·|U|+s. We have to show that (s+1)|U|+s > (s+1)|U|+
. This is equivalent to s(s+3) > (s+1) 2 , which holds for s ≥ 2. Hence S is not (s+1)-locally stable and thus does not provide full local stability.
For the converse direction, let us make the following useful observation: if T with |T | = ℓ contains an element that is ranked below the ℓ-th representative of voter v, then v does not prefer T to S. Now let us first show that S provides ℓ-local stability forSimilarly as before, none of the voters from V U and V ′ prefers T to S. Hence, also in this case, we have shown V * cannot be sufficiently large. We conclude that S satisfies ℓ-local stability for ℓ ∈ {2, . . . , s}.
We have established that S provides ℓ-local stability for all ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , s, s+2}. Hence, if S fails full local stability, then it fails (s + 1)-local stability. Let V * ⊆ V and T ⊆ C witness that S is not (s + 1)-locally stable. First, let us show that |V * | ≥ (s + 1) · |U| + s: Since V * witness that S is not (s + 1)-locally stable, we know that |V
. Note that has to contain at least s voters from V U . First, we show that T ∩ U contains a vertex of every color and |T ∩ U| = s. Then we are going to show that |V * ∩ V U | = s. We conclude the proof by showing that the corresponding vertices form a clique in G.
To show that T ∩ U contains a vertex of every color, let us first observe that w s+1 ∈ T ; otherwise voters inV would not prefer T over S and so V * would not be of sufficient size. Since T ⊆ S, there exists a j ∈ [s] such that w j / ∈ T . Now assume towards a contradiction that T ∩ U contains no i-colored vertices. Let x denote the number of colors which are not used in T ; by our assumption x ≥ 1. We are going to show that in this case V * is not of sufficient size: If T contains neither i-colored vertices nor w j , then voters in V Since |V * | ≥ s+(s+1)|U|, the set V * has to contain at least s voters from V U . Observe that voter v a with g(a) = i may only prefer T to S if a ∈ T . This follows from the already established facts that T contains an i-colored vertex and, assuming this vertex is a, v a is the only i-colored voter ranking a above {w 1 , . . . , w s+1 }. Furthermore, if v a prefers T to S, it has to hold that T ∩ U ⊆ N(a) ∪ {a}. Hence T ∩ U is a clique. As T ∩ U contains a vertex of every color, T ∩ U is a multicolored clique.
Corollary 8. Given an election E = (C, V ) and a committee S, it is W[1]-hard to decide whether S provides full local stability for E when parameterized by the committee size k.
Proof. The Multicolored Clique problem is W[1]-hard [12] and the reduction used in the proof of Theorem 5 is a parametrized reduction (k = s + 2).
We have not settled the complexity of finding a committee that provides full local stability, but we expect this problem to be computationally hard as well. More precisely, it belongs to the second level of the polynomial hierarchy (membership verification can be expressed as "there exists a committee such that each possible deviation by each group of voters is not a Pareto improvement for them," where both quantifiers operate over objects of polynomial size); we expect the problem to be complete for this complexity class.
Conclusions and Research Directions
We have considered two generalizations of the notion of a Condorcet winner to the case of multi-winner elections: the one proposed by Gehrlein [15] and Ratliff [21] and the one defined in this paper (but inspired by the works of Aziz et al. [2] and Elkind et al. [10] ). We have provided evidence that the former approach is very majoritarian in spirit and is well-suited for shortlisting tasks (in particular, we have shown that the objection based on weakly Gehrlein-stable rules necessarily failing enlargement consistency does not apply to strongly Gehrlein-stable rules). On the other hand, we have given arguments that local stability may lead to diverse committees, whereas full local stability may lead to committees that represent the voters proportionally. (We use qualifications such as "may lead" instead of "leads" because, technically, (fully) local stable rules may behave arbitrarily on elections where (fully) locally stable committees do not exist).
In our discussion, we have only very briefly mentioned rules that are either Gehrleinstable or locally stable. Many such rules have been defined in the literature [17] , and these rules call for a more detailed study, both axiomatic and algorithmic. Our results indicate that weakly Gehrlein-stable and locally stable rules are unlikely to be polynomial-time computable; it would be desirable to find practical heuristics or design efficient exponential algorithms.
